Deceptive jamming may not only induce a large amount of false alarms and deteriorate the target detection performance, but also lead to degraded space-time adaptive processing (STAP) performance in an airborne radar. To tackle these issues, this paper proposes a cognitive transmitting scheme to counter the deceptive jamming for airborne array radar. The proposed approach is composed of two steps. The first step is the deceptive jamming perception. A specially designed high pulse repetition frequency (PRF) waveform is transmitted, and then the deceptive jamming is identified according to the angle clustering feature of the false targets. In the second step, the phase-only transmit pattern with notches at the jammers' directions is designed. The encountered pattern synthesis problem is nonconvex due to the fixed excitations constraint. To solve this problem, a nested alternating direction method of multipliers (N-ADMM) is proposed. With the developed approach, the radiated power at the jammers' directions is attenuated significantly. Therefore, the probing signal possesses the characteristic of low probability of intercept (LPI). Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Airborne radar is an effective sensor for providing longrange and wide-area ground moving targets reconnaissance or surveillance [1] - [3] . The airborne radar usually operates at a high altitude, which means it is easy to suffer from electronic attacks. The typical electronic attack includes suppressive jamming and deceptive jamming. The suppressive jamming will raise the noise level of radar system, and thus degrade the performance of target detection [4] . Different from the suppressive jamming, deceptive jamming can not only raise the detection threshold, but also mislead the radar system to track false targets [5] . Even worse, the radar data processor The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Wei Liu . is easy to be saturated in the presence of dense false targets [6] . Generally, compared with the suppressive jamming, the deceptive jamming is more difficult to be eliminated or identified in a radar system. To counter deceptive jamming, various electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) have been proposed [7] - [17] . They can be categorized into two types, i.e., receive processing-based approaches and transmit modulation-based approaches.
The receive processing-based approaches try to filter or identify deceptive jamming based solely on the received signal [7] - [10] . Space-time adaptive processing (STAP) is a typical receive processing-based approach in an airborne radar [7] . It combines multiple spatial channels with multiple coherent pulses to realize clutter and jamming rejection. Since the locations of false targets are usually unpredictable in range domain, it is hard to obtain sufficient range samples used for deceptive jamming covariance matrix estimation. Therefore, STAP has limited performance in rejecting deceptive jamming. The polarization filtering-based approach has the ability to suppress deceptive jamming to some extent [8] , but this approach needs extra polarization channels which will bring increased hardware cost. In addition, the motion feature and the phase noise of digital radio frequency memory (DFRM) could be used to identify deceptive jamming [9] , [10] . However, these approaches can only distinguish the deceptive jamming from the true targets, and the negative impact of deceptive jamming on target detection is still existing.
Different from above receive processing-based approaches, the transmit modulation-based approaches try to modulate the probing signal or transmit pattern to reducing the probability of radar being jammed [11] - [17] . The frequency agile and waveform diversity-based approaches are effective transmit modulation-based anti-jamming schemes [11] - [13] . However, these schemes will complicate the radar signal. Moreover, their influence on suppression of space-time coupled clutter has not been considered. The transmit pattern notching with prior knowledge of jammers' directions is another typical transmit modulation-based approach [14] - [17] . The synthesized beampattern has low gains at the jammers' directions. Therefore, the probability of radar signal being intercepted could be reduced significantly. The greatest advantage of transmit pattern notching is that it will not complicate the probing waveforms and not change the space-time coupling characteristic of the ground clutter. Therefore, conventional STAP algorithms can achieve a satisfactory performance in this case. However, the problem of deceptive jamming identification and direction finding in a practical airborne radar system is rarely discussed in the existing literature.
The development trend of modern radar signal processing has gradually changed from data-based adaptive receiving processing to cognitive transmitting and cognitive receiving processing, that is, radar can adjust transmitting and receiving systems adaptively according to the electromagnetic environment. This kind of fully adaptive radar is referred to as cognitive radar [18] - [20] . The perceptionaction cycle of a cognitive radar is mainly composed of three steps, i.e., sensing the environment, deciding upon an appropriate action, and then adapting accordingly [20] . In this work, the problem of anti-deception jamming for airborne array radar is solved in a cognitive perspective. Specifically, in the perception stage, the perception waveform is rationally designed to sense the jamming environment. Considering that the clutter signal will deteriorate the performance of parameter estimation, a high pulse repetition frequency (PRF) waveform with a relatively large clutter-free region is devised to sense the deceptive jamming. Then, the number of jammers and corresponding directions is estimated according to the clustering feature of the false targets.
In the action stage, the transmit pattern is synthesized with notches at the jammers' directions. In order to simplify the hardware cost, we assume that only the phase of each antenna element is adjustable. The resulting problem is equivalent to a quadratically constrained linear programming (QCLP) problem with fixed amplitudes constraint, and thus, it is nonconvex. Unlike the existing approaches for phase-only pattern design using semi-definite relaxation (SDR) technique [16] , [17] , a nested alternating direction method of multipliers (N-ADMM) is proposed to tackle the nonconvex QCLP problem. More specifically, we first apply variable splitting to introduce auxiliary two-element real vectors for each angular response constraint [21] . In doing so, the original problem can be solved via tackling two subproblems iteratively. Note that one of the subproblems is still nonconvex due to the fixed amplitudes constraint. The ADMM is applied again to tackle this subproblem at each iteration. The original problem can be efficiently solved by the proposed N-ADMM without using the CVX toolbox [22] . With the proposed active anti-jamming scheme, the radiated power at the jammers' directions is attenuated significantly. Therefore, the probability of radar being jammed could be decreased significantly. Furthermore, the signal processing burden at the receiving end could be reduced effectively.
The main contributions of the proposed work are briefly summarized as follows.
i) We propose to counter the deceptive jamming for the airborne radar in a cognitive perspective. A full perceptionaction cycle is given.
ii) The criterion for sensing waveform parameter design is presented with enhanced environment perception capability.
iii) An algorithm for deceptive jamming identification and localization is devised based on the angle-clustering feature of false targets. iv) A novel method, termed Nested ADMM (N-ADMM), is proposed to tackle the problem of phase-only pattern notching. The corresponding scheme for computational load reduction is also provided. Compared with the SDR-based approaches, the proposed N-ADMM requires less computation cost meanwhile owns better performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the signal model of airborne array radar. Section III elaborates the proposed cognitive anti-deception jamming scheme. Section IV gives some discussions on the proposed approach. Simulation results are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in section V, while the conclusions are drawn in section VI.
Notations: Vectors and matrices are denoted by boldface lowercase and uppercase letters, respectively. The E { }, diag { }, , T and H stand for the expectation, diagonalization, Frobenius norm, transpose and Hermitian transpose, respectively. The ⊗ and represent the Kronecker product and Hadamard product, respectively. The I n denotes the n × n identity matrix, while { } and { } mean the real and imaginary parts, respectively. 
II. SIGNAL MODEL OF AIRBORNE ARRAY RADAR
Let us consider an airborne pulse-Doppler (PD) radar system that utilizes a N -element antenna array with interelement spacing d, and a K -pulse narrowband coherent waveform with pulse-repetition-interval (PRI) T p . Fig. 1 depicts the operational geometry of an airborne radar. Only the sidelobe jamming is considered in this work. The antenna array is a sidelooking array whose axis is aligned with the flight direction. The height of the radar is H and the speed of the platform is v.
After matched filtering, the received space-time snapshot of the target can be expressed as [7] 
where α t is the complex amplitude of the target, a (ϑ t ) and b ( t ) denote the spatial steering vector and temporal steering vector respectively, which are given by
where ϑ t = d cos θ t /λ is the normalized spatial frequency, t = 2v t T p /λ denotes the normalized Doppler frequency, λ represents the wavelength, θ t and v t stand for the direction of arrival (DOA) and radial velocity of the target.
According to the general clutter model introduced in [7] , the clutter return from each ambiguous range can be modeled as the superposition of many independent clutter sources. Therefore, the space-time snapshot of the clutter can be expressed as
where N a is the number of range ambiguities, N c is the number of clutter patches, α p q is the complex amplitude of the clutter patch, ϑ pq = d cos θ pq /λ and pq = 2T p v cos θ pq /λ are normalized spatial frequency and normalized Doppler frequency of the clutter patch respectively, and θ pq is the DOA of the clutter patch. The DFRM repeat jammer has the ability to intercept and store the radar signal, and modulate the intercepted signal with arbitrary delay and Doppler [5] . Therefore, the coherent repeater jammer is able to generate plenty of false targets, namely, deceptive jamming. Since the waveforms of false targets are very similar to that of true target, the deceptive jamming is very easy to obtain a high processing gain of matched filtering in the radar's receiver. Similar to the target snapshot, the space-time snapshot of deceptive jamming can be expressed as
where M is number of jammers, P m denotes the number of false targets generated by the m-th jammer, ϑ j,m stands for the normalized spatial frequency of the m-th jammer, α j,mi and j,mi are the complex amplitude and normalized Doppler frequency of the false target, respectively. It is worth noting that the false targets generated by the same jammer share the same spatial frequency. According to aforementioned definitions, if the range bin of interest contains a true target and deceptive jamming, then the received space-time snapshot can be expressed as
where x n is the noise component. We assume that the noise snapshot x n is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix given by σ 2 n I NK , where σ 2 n is the noise power.
The STAP technique is a critical data-based receiving processing technique in an airborne array radar [1] . It combines multiple spatial channels with coherent pulses to realize clutter and jamming rejection, provided that the statistical property of clutter and jamming could be estimated correctly. However, in the deceptive jamming scenario, the false targets are randomly and sparsely distributed in range-Doppler domain. In this case, the space-time dataset will become a non-homogeneous dataset. On one hand, to improve the performance of STAP in non-homogeneous environment, the STAP algorithms are usually carried out combined with non-homogeneous detector (NHD) [23] . That is to say, the false target contaminated samples will be removed from the dataset before STAP. Thus, the statistical property of deceptive jamming is hard to be correctly estimated in this case. On the other hand, if the STAP algorithms are performed without using NHD, the statistical property of deceptive jamming is still hard to be estimated correctly (especially the power of jamming), because the false targets are randomly and sparsely distributed in range domain. In summary, it is hard to obtain sufficient training data to estimate the statistical property of deceptive jamming. Therefore, STAP has limited performance in deceptive jamming suppression. The residual false targets will introduce a large amount of false alarms, which would bring heavy computational load to subsequent data processing. In the next section, a scheme of cognitive anti-deception jamming will be introduced to circumvent the above mentioned problem.
III. COGNITIVE-TRANSMIT-BASED ANTI-DECEPTION JAMMING
In this section, we introduce a cognitive transmit-based antideception jamming scheme. The block diagram of the proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 2 . It is mainly composed of two parts, i.e., deceptive jamming perception and transmit pattern notching. The details of these two parts will be introduced in the following subsections.
A. DECEPTIVE JAMMING PERCEPTION FOR AIRBORNE ARRAY RADAR
In the perception stage, two fundamental missions should be accomplished: (1) sense and recognize deceptive jamming and (2) estimate the directions of jammers both in cluttercontaminated environment. To this end, a burst of sensing pulses with specially designed waveform is transmitted. Then, the targets (including true targets and false targets) are detected from the sensing data, and the DOAs of the detected targets are estimated. Further, the deceptive jamming can be identified according to the clustering feature of the estimated DOAs, meanwhile the number of jammers could be determined. The detailed steps for deceptive jamming perception are given as follows. Step 1 (Sensing Waveform Parameter Design and Target Detection): Generally, the ground clutter of an airborne radar would spread in Doppler domain due to platform motion. As a consequence, a large proportion of Doppler region may be occupied by the ground clutter when the radar system operates at low-or mid-PRF. The probability of target detection and the accuracy of DOA estimation will degrade if the target is located in clutter region. In order to improve the performance of deceptive jamming perception, it is reasonable to employ high-PRF waveform. In high-PRF case, the clutterfree region is relatively large. Therefore, the false targets (i.e., deceptive jamming) will be located in clutter-free region with a high probability.
According to the observation geometry in Fig. 1 , the Doppler bandwidth of the ground clutter is
Therefore, the PRF of the sensing waveform should be larger than B d . However, the upper bound of PRF should not be infinite. Because that the higher the PRF is, the fewer the range bins are. If there exist a large amount of false targets, the number of range bins available for background level estimation would become very small in large PRF case. As a result, the target detection performance will suffer from significant degradation. In this work, as a rule of thumb, the PRF of the sensing waveform is set as 2B d to 4B d to reserve a relatively large clutter-free region and sufficient range bins. The other parameters of sensing waveform could be set to be the same as that of probing waveform. After matched filtering, the received sensing data can be expressed as (6) . In order to detect the false targets, the received data is firstly transformed into range-Doppler domain via PD processing. The PD processing is actually the non-adaptive space-time filtering. Therefore, for the target with normalized spatial frequency ϑ 0 , the output of thē k-th Doppler bin corresponding to the l-th range bin can be expressed as
wherek = 1, 2, · · · ,K andK is the number of Doppler bins which could be selected asK = 2 log 2 K , l = 1, 2, · · · , L and L is the number of range bins, k = (k − 1) K denotes the normalized Doppler frequency of thek-th Doppler bin, q ∈ R K ×1 is the temporal taper vector, e.g., Chebyshev or Taylor window. Then, we can perform CFAR detection in range-Doppler domain. Considering that the performance of cell-averaging CFAR (CA-CFAR) detector degrades rapidly in nonideal conditions caused by multiple interfering targets (i.e. multiple false targets scenario considered in this paper), the orderedstatistic CFAR (OS-CFAR) is a reasonable alternative to the CA-CFAR [24] . The OS-CFAR trades a small loss in detection performance relative to the CA-CFAR in ideal conditions for much less performance degradation in nonideal conditions [25] . Define a set consisting of the coordinates of the detected targets in range-Doppler map, i.e.,
where ξ = TZ is the detection threshold, Z is the averaging background level which is estimated by the l 0 -th largest element of the rank-ordered magnitudes of L 0 reference cells, T is the threshold factor which can be determined by the probability of false alarm, l 0 and L 0 [24] , i.e.,
where (x) = +∞ 0 e −t t x−1 dt is the Gamma function of x. Fig. 3 illustrates the possible situations of the detected targets. It is shown that the detected targets may be located in clutter region or in clutter-free region (with a high possibility). Step 2 (DOA Estimation): As shown in Fig.3 , the detected targets are separable in range-Doppler domain, thus the DOA of the detected target can be estimated in post-Doppler element space. There exist a lot of DOA estimation methods, such as subspace-based methods [26] - [28] , compressive sensing-based methods [29] , [30] , maximum likelihoodbased (ML) methods [31] , [32] and so on. Among these methods, only the ML-based methods are capable of handling the interference (such as ground clutter). Therefore, in this paper, the ML method is utilized to estimate the DOA.
The spatial data vector of thek-th Doppler bin can be obtained asxk
According to the ML estimation theory [31] , the normalized target spatial frequency can be estimated bŷ
whereRk is the interference-plus-noise covariance matrix of thek-th Doppler bin. When the target is located in clutterfree region, the covariance matrixRk could be replaced by the noise covariance matrix, i.e.,
If the detected target is located in clutter region, the covariance matrixRk should be estimated by the clutter samples, that isRk
whereL 0 = L l=1,l / ∈ l is the number of available clutter samples. It should be noted that the interfering targets included inRk will lead to significant DOA estimation performance degradation. Therefore, the range samples which contain the interfering targets are discarded in the process of estimatingRk .
Step 3 (Deceptive Jamming Identification and Jammer Localizatio): It can be seen from (5) that the false targets generated by the same jammer share the same DOA. It means that the estimated false target DOAs will concentrate in the angle regions where the jammers are. Hence, the deceptive jamming could be recognized according to the number of targets in a given angle region. Specifically, given the angle region [θk l − ϑ,θk l + ϑ] (where (k, l) ∈ ) and a threshold N min , if the target number Nk l in the angle region [θk l − ϑ,θk l + ϑ] exceeds N min , we conclude that there may exist a jammer in this angle region. The detailed algorithm for jammer localization is summarized in Table 1 . Some remarks on the proposed algorithm are given as follows.
Remark 1: At the input stage, the true targets are removed, i.e., only the targets outside of mainlobe are processed.
Remark 2: The parameter ϑ is selected as ϑ 3dB 10 to account for the deviation of estimated DOA, where ϑ 3dB is the beamwidth.
Remark 3: The parameter N min is selected as 3. A possible scenario is that there may be more than 3 sidelobe true targets appearing at the same angle region. In this case, the synthesized beampattern will introduce an additional notch at this angle region. (In practice, the possibility of multiple sidelobe true targets appearing at the same angle region is very small).
B. TRANSMIT PATTERN NOTCHING USING N-ADMM
In the action stage, the transmit pattern is synthesized to produce notches at the jammers' directions. Herein, in order to simplify the hardware structure, the notches are generated via phase-only weight control. That is to say, the shaped beampattern could be generated by only adjusting the phase of each antenna element.
The problem of phase-only beampattern synthesis can be formulated as maximizing the mainbeam gain under the weight amplitude constraint and angular response constraint, that is where w = [w 1 , w 2 , ..., w N ] T ∈ C N ×1 is the so-called weight vector, {c n } N n=1 are the amplitudes of the weighting factors {w n } N n=1 , U m stands for the upper bound of the corresponding radiated power. By introducing an auxiliary variable η, (15) could be equivalently formulated as a minimization problem:
Actually, (16) is a QCLP problem, but it is nonconvex due to the first and the third constraints. In order to solve this problem, a N-ADMM is proposed. This algorithm is based on the idea that multiple inequality constraints could be associated with different optimization variables so that they can be tackled separately [21] . More specifically, we first introduce real-valued two-element auxiliary vectors
and A θ j,m is defined in the same manner. With these definitions, (16) becomes
Define the augmented Lagrangian as
where λ 0 ∈ R 2×1 and λ m ∈ R 2×1 are the Lagrange multiplier vectors, while ρ > 0 is a user-defined parameter representing the primal step size. Then all unknowns in (21) as well as λ 0 and λ m can be determined using the iterative manner of the ADMM from 0,ρ w, η, y 0 , y m , λ 0 , λ m :
Step 1: Updatew with given η (i) , y 
Overlooking the terms independent ofw, (23) can be compactly rewritten as
where
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Note that (24) is still nonconvex due to the amplitude constraints. Actually, the amplitude constraints can be rewritten as multiple quadratic equality constraints. By doing so, (24) could also be solved by ADMM efficiently. The detailed procedure to updatew is given in Appendix.
Step 2: Update {η, y 0 , y m } with given w (i+1) , λ
After removing the irrelevant terms, (27) can be rewritten as
whereỹ
Note that y m is independent of η and y 0 in (28) . Thus, (28) can be decomposed into two optimization subproblems, i.e., min y m
and min η,y 0
Actually, (29) can be further separated into M subproblems, and the m-th subproblem is
The solution of (31) is given by
However, for the subproblem (30) , η is coupled with y 0 . Fortunately, with given η < 0, it is readily shown that the minimum of y 0 −ỹ (i) 0 2 can be calculated as
Therefore, by substituting (33) back into (30) , (30) can be rewritten as a function of η, that is
Note that, when − ỹ (i) 0 ≤ η < 0, the minimum of (34) is
The second row of (34) is a quadratic function of η which can be rewritten in a stand quadratic form, i.e.,
Since − ỹ (i) 0 − 1 ρ < − ỹ (i) 0 (because ρ > 0), the minimum of (36) is
.
Obviously, V 2 < V 1 (because ρ > 0). Therefore, the optimal solution of (34) is dependent on (36) . According to (36) , we can determine the optimal η as
Once η (i+1) is determined, the optimal y 0 can be obtained by solving (30) , that is
Step 3: Update λ 0 and λ m as
Via iterating Steps 1 to 3, the proposed N-ADMM for transmit pattern notching is summarized in Table 2 . 
IV. DISCUSSIONS A. ON PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 1) CPI LENGTH OF SENSE WAVEFORM
In the deceptive jamming perception stage, a burst of pulses is transmitted to sense the jamming environment. Actually, the CPI length of sense waveform could be shorter than that of normal probing waveform. This is because the false targets are much easier to be detected than the true target due to the large jamming power. In another words, the integration time of the sense waveform (i.e., the length of CPI) could be set as a small value (such as a half of the CPI of probing waveform). A short CPI will reduce the data throughput of the radar system and also reduce the consumption of time resource in perception stage.
2) NOTCH WIDTH
In the transmit pattern notching stage, we assumed the jamming is a point-like jamming. The synthesized pattern can only produce nulls at the estimated directions of the jammers. In practice, the DOA estimation algorithm will induce DOA deviation, meanwhile the platform motion also results in direction bias. Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the notches to some extent to handle these biases. In our numerical examples, all notches are widened to 3 • via adding angle grids around the estimated DOAs of jammers.
B. ON COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF N-ADMM 1) ANALYSIS ON COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF N-ADMM
For each update of primal variablew, we need to solve (24) via the inner ADMM algorithm. In the inner ADMM, the update ofw includes calculating d 14N 3 ) . Similarly, the update of z (using (A.19)) will also take O (10N 2  +14N 3 ). In addition, the update of β 2 takes O(2N 2 ). Therefore, solving (24) will take O(log(ε −1 )(22N 2 + 28N 3 )) [33] , where ε is a given accuracy of the inner ADMM algorithm. For each update of auxiliary variables {η, y 0 , y m }, it will take O(2M ). Therefore, the computational complexity of N-ADMM is O(log(ε −1 )(22N 2 + 28N 3 ) + 2M ) at each iteration.
2) COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY REDUCTION SCHEME
Note that the computational complexity of N-ADMM at each iteration is mainly dependent on solving (24) . More specifically, it depends on calculating R 3 , we find they are sparse matrices since E n is a sparse diagonal matrix. Therefore, the computational complexity of N-ADMM could be reduced significantly using the sparse structure of R 
where D In addition, using the sparse structure of the matrix, updating d of N-ADMM will reduce to O(log(ε −1 )(8N 2 + 40N ) + 2M ) at each iteration.
For comparison, the computational complexity of SDRbased methods are given as follows. The method of [17] is a standard SDR problem and its computational complexity is O(max {M , N } 4 N 1/2 log(ε −1 1 )), where ε 1 is the solution accuracy [36] . The method of [16] is a iterated version of method [17] , and its computational complexity is O(max {M , N } 4 N 1/2 log(ε −1 1 )I 1 ), where I 1 is the predefined iteration number. The practical running times of all methods depend on the iteration numbers, and they will be compared with each other in Section V.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, simulation experiments are carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
The simulation parameters of airborne array radar are given in Table 3 . We assume there exist 3 jammers and 5 true targets in the battle field, and each jammer generates 20 false targets with randomly assigned range-Doppler parameter. The locations of these targets in range-Doppler map are shown in Fig. 4 . The other parameters of the jammers and true targets are given in Table 4 . The target, deceptive jamming and clutter signals are generated according to (1), (5) and (4), respectively. Fig. 5 depicts the range-Doppler map of PD processing, and the result of CFAR detection is also given in this plot. It can be seen that the Doppler bandwidth of clutter is about f PRF 2, and one half of targets are located in clutter region. After CFAR detection, most of the targets (53 targets including true targets and false targets, marked with green cross) are detected out except those located close to or in mainlobe clutter region. Obviously, it is difficult to distinguish these detected targets only relying on the range or Doppler information. In the subsequence, the DOA of these detected targets will be estimated by ML algorithm (12) , and then the deceptive jamming will be identified according to the algorithm proposed in Table 1 .
2) RESULT OF DOA ESTIMATION Fig. 6 shows the estimated DOAs of all detected targets. It is shown that the DOAs can be correctly estimated by the proposed ML algorithm, and the estimated DOAs are concentrated in four angle regions corresponding to the four signal sources. Subsequently, the deceptive jamming will be identified according to the angle clustering feature. 
3) RESULT OF DECEPTIVE JAMMING IDENTIFICATION AND JAMMER LOCALIZATION
According to the algorithm presented in Table 1 , the DOAs within mainbeam are firstly excluded from the DOA data set. The residual DOAs are given in Fig. 7 . It can be seen that the DOAs corresponding to the true targets are removed, and the residual targets are false targets or false alarms. Fig. 8 shows the histogram of the distribution of the residual DOAs. It is shown that the DOAs are mainly located in three angle regions which corresponds to three jammers. With this observation, the deceptive jamming can be identified and classified by the proposed angle-clustering-feature-based classification algorithm. Running result shows there exist three different classes of deceptive jamming. Then, the directions of the jammers can be obtained by averaging the DOAs of every class. Finally, the DOAs of jammers are estimated as −51.01 • , 10.98 • and 21.02 • respectively, which are quite approximate to the theoretic values. Subsequently, the estimated DOAs will be feed into the action stage for transmit pattern notching.
B. PERFORMANCE OF TRANSMIT PATTERN NOTCHING WITH N-ADMM
In this subsection, we will assess the performance of the proposed N-ADMM algorithm in terms of convergence, beampattern, magnitudes and running time. The results of SDP-based methods in [16] and [17] are also given for comparison. Both solution vectors of [16] and [17] are obtained by performing rank-1 decomposition of the resulting matrices.
1) BEAMPATTERN WITH NON-UNIMODULAR EXCITATIONS
Firstly, all algorithms are evaluated under the condition of non-unimodular excitations. The penalty parameters of outer ADMM and inner ADMM are set as ρ = 0.2 and ρ 1 = 20 respectively. Fig. 9(a) shows the primal residual norms and stopping criterion limit of N-ADMM versus the iteration number. It can be seen that the termination condition of N-ADMM algorithm is met after 1523 iterations. Fig. 9(b) reveals the objective function values in (21) versus the iteration number. As illustrated in Fig. 9(b) , the objective function is minimized at the 7th iteration. However, there exists a tiny gap between the steady value of the objective function and the optimal value. This may attribute to the fact that the solution needs to make a trade-off between the objective function value and amplitude constraints. Fig. 10(a) gives the normalized beampatterns (to the theoretic array gain) of three different methods. The static sumbeam without notching is also illustrated for comparison. It is shown that all methods can place satisfied deep notches at the directions of jammers. However, as depicted in Fig. 10(a) , the array gain loss of the proposed algorithm is only 0.064 dB, while the gain losses of the method [16] and method [17] are 1.002 dB and 3.082 dB respectively. The reason can be find in Fig. 10(b) which shows the amplitudes of each element of the solutions. It can be seen that the magnitudes of the proposed algorithm matches the given magnitudes very well, while the magnitudes of the method [16] and method [17] are lower than the given magnitudes. Therefore, the array gain losses of method [16] and method [17] are larger than that of the proposed method.
2) BEAMPATTERN WITH UNIMODULAR EXCITATIONS
Subsequently, all algorithms are assessed in the case of unimodular excitations. The penalty parameters of outer ADMM and inner ADMM are set as ρ = 0.15 and ρ 1 = 20 respectively. Fig. 11(a) illustrates the primal residual norms and stopping criterion limit of N-ADMM versus the iteration number. It is shown that the termination condition of N-ADMM algorithm is met after 1185 iterations. Fig. 11(b) gives the objective function values in (21) versus the iteration number. It can be seen that the objective function is minimized at the 6th iteration. However, there exists a gap between the optimal value and steady value of the objective function. This phenomenon is similar to Fig. 9(b) . Fig. 12(a) gives the normalized beampatterns of three different methods. The static sumbeam without notching is also depicted for comparison. It is shown that all methods can introduce required deep notches at the directions of jammers. However, as revealed in Fig. 12(a) , the gain loss of the proposed algorithm is only 0.435 dB, while the gain losses of the method [16] and method [17] are 1.0 dB and 3.445 dB respectively. Fig. 12(b) exhibits the magnitudes of each element of the solutions. It can be seen that the magnitudes of the proposed algorithm matches the given magnitudes very well, while the magnitudes of the method [16] and method [17] are much lower than the given magnitudes. Therefore, the array gain loss of the proposed method is smaller than those of method [16] and method [17] .
3) RUNNING TIME
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed N-ADMM algorithm, the running time is tested under the scenarios of unimodular constraint and non-unimodular constraint. All the numerical examples are analyzed using matlab 2015b version, perfoming on a standard PC (with 2.5 GHz of double-core CPU and 4 GB of RAM). Table 5 gives the running time of the proposed algorithm under different conditions. The results of method [16] and method [17] are also given for comparison, where the optimization problems in [16] and [17] are both solved by CVX toolbox [22] , and the iteration number of method [16] is set as 5. It is shown that the proposed algorithm has the shortest running time, meanwhile it possesses the best performance (in terms of gain loss and magnitudes). 
C. INFLUENCE ON STAP
In this part, we will examine the impact of the proposed antijamming scheme on STAP. In order to enhance the robustness of STAP in dense targets environment, the NHD is used to exclude the non-homogeneous samples (i.e., the range bins involving true target or false target) before covariance matrix estimating [23] . Fig. 13 illustrates the STAP results of the 41th Doppler bin (the corresponding normalized Doppler frequency is 0.125) with and without active anti-jamming measures. Only the outputs of the 225-th to the 275-th range bins are given in this figure. It can be seen that, in the case of absence of active anti-jamming measure, although STAP can suppress the clutter, it is failed to reject the deceptive jamming. In contrast, if we take active anti-jamming measure, the received signal will not include deceptive jamming (we assume the radar signal cannot be intercepted by the jammers). Therefore, as illustrated in Fig. 13 , the output of STAP does not contain false target. This will be a great benefit to the subsequent data processing (such as target tracking). 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the problem of anti-deception jamming in an airborne array radar is considered. A cognitive transmit pattern notching scheme is proposed to deal with the above problem. The proposed approach mainly consists of two parts, i.e., deceptive jamming perception and transmit pattern notching.
In the perception stage, the sensing waveform parameter is rationally designed to enhance the performance of target detection and DOA estimation. Then, the deceptive jamming is identified according to the angle-clustering feature. Finally, the directions of jammers are determined by averaging the classified DOAs.
In the action stage, the transmit pattern is designed with notches at the jammers' directions. The encountered problem is virtually a nonconvex QCLP problem. A N-ADMM algorithm with closed-form solutions at every iteration is proposed to cope with this problem. Simulation results shows that the proposed approach is valid in different conditions. The proposed N-ADMM can also be applied to other analogous QCLP problems. Although the proposed phase-only pattern synthesis algorithm has lower computational complexity, less gain loss and more accurate magnitudes, its sidelobe level is slightly higher than those of the existing methods.
In this work, we mainly consider the problem of antisidelobe deceptive jamming. Future research area may focus on anti-mainlobe deceptive jamming using other resources of the radar system.
